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Summary findings
Narayan  and  Pritchett  construct  a measure  of  "social  The  magnitude  of social capital's  effect  on incomes  is
capital"  in rural  Tanzania,  using  data  from  the Tanzania  impressive:  a one  standard  deviation  increase  in village
Social Capital  and  Poverty  Survey  (SCPS), a large-scale  social capital  increases  a household  proxy  for  income  by
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trust  in various  institutions  and  individuals.  nonfarming  assets,  or a tripling  of the level  of education.
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SCPS and from  an  earlier  household  survey,  the Human  capital  affects  incomes:  better  publicly  provided  services,
Resources  Development  Survey).  In doing  so, they  show  more  community  activity,  greater  use of modern
that  "social  capital"  is indeed  both  capital  (in that  it  agricultural  inputs,  and greater  use of credit  in
raises  incomes)  and  social  (in that  household  incomes  agriculture.
depend  on village,  not  just household,  social capital).
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Cents  and Sociability:
Household  Income  and Social Capital  in Rural  Tanzania'
Beyond  apparently  now old fashioned  'physical"  capital, human capital, natural capital,
institutional  capital and social capital all clamor for attention. With capitalism  all the rage,
perhaps the proliferating  rechristenings  as 'capital" of otherwise  perfectly serviceable  concepts
is understandable. But fashion aside, the popularity  of 'capital'isms is due in part to the robust
usefulness  of the underlying metaphor: stuff that augments  incomes but is not totally consumed
in use.  The attraction  of investigating  the incomes  of households  by examining  their
ownership  of the various "capitals"  is obvious. However, while obvious, an exclusive  focus on
households  is seriously incomplete. Factors both at the national level of  policies  and
institutions  (Olson, 1996) and at the community  level affect the fortunes of households  and are
potentially  as important  as the household's own capitals.
In this paper we show that associational  relationships  and social norms  of villages in
rural Tanzania are both capital and social.  After outlining the various concepts of social
capital in the introduction  we tell how (and why) we created data on social capital using a large
The Social  Capital  and Poverty  Survey  was conducted  as part of a Participatory  Poverty
Assessment  led by Deepa Narayan  as a joint activity  of the government  of Tanzania,  the
University  of Dar Es Salaam,  and the World  Bank, funded  by the British  Overseas  Development
Agency. The Human  Resource  Development  Survey  data used in this paper come from a
nationally  representative  survey  of 5,000 households  in Tanzania  which was a joint effort
undertaken  by the Department  of Economics  of the University  of Dar es Salaam,  the Government
of Tanzania,  and the World Bank, and was funded  by the World  Bank, the government  of Japan,
and the British  Overseas  Development  Agency. We would like  to thank Jonathan  Isham,  and
Sushenjit  Bandopadhyay  for collaboration  in the early  stages  of the research,  Christiaan
Grootaert,  Dean  Joliffe,  Michael  Kremer,  Peter Lanjouw,  and Jonathan  Morduch  for useful
comments,  and Deon Filmer  for help and insights  on the econometrics.2
scale household  survey in rural Tanzania  designed to query households  about their social
connections  and attitudes. Second, using this and data on incomes  we show that a village's
social capital has an effect on incomes  of the households  in that village, an effect that is
empirically large, definitely  social, and plausibly  causal.  Finally, we use the two data sets to
examine a number of proximate  channels  through  which social capital appears  to operate.
Introduction
Social capital, while not all things to all people, is many things to many people.  A
dramatic  restriction of what one might mean must precede  any attempt to estimate either
"social  capital' or its impact. What do we mean (and what do we not mean) by social capital
and why do we think it might affect incomes?
By "social  capital"  we mean the quantity  and quality of associational  life and the related
social norms. The basic survey instrument, the Social  Capital and Poverty Survey (SCPS),
asked individuals  a variety of questions  about three dimensions  of social capital.  First,
individuals  were queried about their membership  in various voluntary associations  or groups  to
investigate  the raw magnitude. For each group in which an individual  reported membership,
questions were asked about that group's characteristics  in several  dimensions  relevant to that
group's contribution  to social capital.  For instance, if the group's membership  is 'inclusive'
we assumed  any given individual's  membership  in that group contributed more to social capital
than membership  in a group in which membership  is "exclusive' to a particular clan or ethnic
group.  With this data on the frequency  of membership  and the characteristics  of groups we
created an index of the village associational  life, which we argue is a proxy for social capital.3
In addition  to the information  on associational  life we sought to explore the existence  and role
of social and civic norms and individual's attitudes  towards others, focusing  in particular on
the degree of trust individuals  felt towards social groups, such as family, village or tribe, and
towards government  authorities, at the local, district, and national level.
While social capital thus defined as the quantity and quality of local associational  life is
clearly social, is it 'capital"? Does it fit the 'capital' metaphor of something  accumulated
which contributes  to higher income (or, more broadly, better outcomes). Five mechanisms
have been proposed  for how local social capital affects outcomes. From an economist's
viewpoint,  all of these share the characteristic  that pure non-cooperative  action would lead to
inferior outcomes  and hence that greater social capital potentially  leads to better outcomes  by
facilitating  greater cooperation.
First,  Putnam's  (1993) fascinating analysis of the variations in public sector efficacy of
the newly created regional  governments  in Italy suggests  that regions of Italy in which people
had greater degrees of horizontal  connections  had more efficacious  governments. He
documents  a close connection  between  the numbers  of voluntary  associations  and the efficacy
of the regional government. Putnam finds that the more likely a region's citizens are to join
football  clubs and choral societies  the faster the regional  governnent is in reimbursing  health
care claims. One way of understanding  this result is that monitoring  the performance  of the
government  is facilitated  by greater social capital, either directly, because  the government
agents themselves  are more embedded  in the social network or perhaps  indirectly  because the
monitoring  of the public provision  of services is a public good (and this is true even if the4
publicly  provided service is itself a private good as long as quality cannot be individually
differentiated) 2 .
Second, independent  of the efficacy of governmental  activity the role of group or
community  cooperative  action in solving problems  with a local 'common property' elements is
potentially  imnportant.  Ostrom's (1990) work suggests  that the ability of local groups  to
cooperate  plays a large role in avoiding  the negative  consequences  of the excessive  exploitation
or under maintenance  of assets that would result from purely individualistic  behavior  under
open access. She points out that the infamous  "tragedy  of the commons"  based on purely
individualistic  behavior is only one possible  outcome  and that cooperative  action can be a
stable outcome. Ajuha (1996) shows that in Cote d'Ivoire the degree of land degradation  is
worse in more ethnically heterogenous  villages,  suggesting  difference  in the effectiveness  of
community  controls and cooperation  depends  on social factors. Wade (1988) documents  wide
differences  in the extent of cooperation  within villages in Southern India, which he attributes
to a significant  degree to differences  in the benefits from cooperation  due to differences  in the
physical characteristics  of the irrigation  network serving the villages. Social capital  may
facilitate  greater cooperation  in the provision  of services which benefit all members  of the
community.
2  Alesina,  Baqir, and Easterly  (1997)  show  that greater ethnic  fragmentation  in US cities
leads  to lower spending  on productive  public  goods (e.g. education,  roads,  sewers)  and is
negatively  related  to the share  of local spending  on welfare. While  not able  to measure  efficacy
directly,  the results  also suggest  higher  public  employment  with greater fragmentation,  possibly
the results  of higher  patronage.5
Third, diffusion  of innovations  might be facilitated  by greater linkages among
individuals. In his review of empirical work on the diffusion  of innovations  Rogers (1983)
reports studies which suggest that "social  participation,"  "interconnectedness  with the social
system,' 'exposure to interpersonal  communication  channels"  and "belonging  to highly
interconnected  systems' are each positively associated  with the early adoption  of innovations.
Recent research  on the adoption  of Green Revolution  innovations  suggest that village level
spillovers  played a role in individuals' adoption  decisions,  but do not examine the role that
social capital may have played in mediating  the village  level effects (Besley  and Case 1994,
Foster and Rosenzweig  1995).
Fourth, greater associational  activity may lead to less imperfect information  and hence
lower transactions  costs and a greater range of market transactions  in outputs, credit, land and
labor leading to higher incomes.  Social links among  parties to economic  transactions  may
increase  their ability to participate  in economic  transactions  which involve some  uncertainty
about compliance,  like credit.  There are two possible  mechanisms  at work.  Social  capital
could lead to a better flow of information  between creditors and borrowers and hence less
adverse selection  and moral hazard in the market for credit.  Social  capital also potentially
expands  the range of enforcement  mechanisms  for default on obligations in environments  in
which recourse to the legal system is costly or impossible.
Fifth, greater sharing of household  risk and informal  insurance may allow households
to pursue higher return but more risky activities  and production techniques. If this is so then a
social safety net that mitigated  the consequences  of adverse  outcomes would lead farmers to6
undertake higher return but also higher risk activities  (Morduch, 1995). Increased  social
capital could lead to greater risk sharing among  villagers and act as an informal  safety net.
What do we not mean by social capital? There are many other equally plausible  and
perhaps  empirically  important  definitions  of  'social capital"  which we do not explore. In
order to distinguish  our work from the previous literature it helps to begin with a more general
definition. In the abstract a 'society" can be thought  of as a series  of nodes (e.g. individuals,
households)  and a set of connections  between those nodes.  The connections  between the
nodes can be any kind of relationship  whether social relationship  (e.g. familial, ethnic), shared
beliefs (e.g. religious), group identification  (e.g. national, local) or a voluntary  association,
whether economic  (e.g. employee, creditor) or non-economic  (e.g. social club).  Different
notions of social capital can be distinguished  by two features. First, whether  the focus is on
the nodes themselves,  and hence on individual's social ties, or on the connections  between the
nodes, the intrinsically  social.  The second distinguishing  feature of the existing empirical
studies on social capital is the specification  of what 'connections"  between individuals  are
counted and how much weight  each different type of link should receive.
While we examine the social by examining  the effect of the density of associational  life
on village outcomes, there is a considerable  body of work on "social  capital' that examines
individual's ownership  of social capital by examining  the worth of each individual's social
connection  to other nodes.  The emphasis  is on the effects on the individual  of having  social
links to valuable  nodes, like having a rich uncle, or growing up in a good neighborhood  (Case
and Katz, 1991), or being a member  of a successful  ethnic group (Borjas, 1994).7
We examine the links between individuals  created by memberships  in voluntary
associations  and social norns,  which potentially  excludes  other dimensions  of social capital.
First, we do not examine  the impact  of any sense of affiliation  with a nation or nation-state  or
any measure of distributional  or ethnic conflict within the polity.  Second, we do not examine
as 'capital' the institutional  "capacity' either of specific  government  or non-government
organizations  nor in the broad sense of society  possessing  a well known  and legally  sanctioned
set of "rules  of the game." Third, we do not analyze  any 'cultural" values or attitudes, such as
degrees of compassion,  altruism, respect, tolerance 4. Fourth we do not examine  the issues
explored  recently  by Knack  and Keefer (1996) on the relationship  between trust, norms of
civic cooperation,  associational  activity  and aggregate  economic  growth and investment  rates.
I.  Data on Social Capital?
We cannot examine  the effects  of what we mean by social capital, only what we
measure. The sections  below  describe the survey and the procedure we used to construct  our
measure of social capital.  The Social  Capital and Poverty Survey (SCPS) was carried out in
rural Tanzania  in April and May of 1995 as part of a larger participatory  poverty assessment
exercise (Narayan, 1997).  While the households  were chosen randomly  within clusters, the
3  Easterly  and Levine  (1996)  have shown  that a measure  of "ethnic  heterogeneity"  is
empirically  associated  with  the adoption  of bad economic  policies,  which  they attribute to the
importance  of distributional  conflict  among  groups.
'  Explaining  economic  performance  by such  "cultural" characteristics  such as the
"Protestant work ethnic" or "Confucianism"  has a history  which  is long and checkered,  as it easily
veers to self-congratulation  or condescension.  Recent  entries  include  Harrison  (1992)  on culture
and  Fukuyama's  examination  of trust (1995).8
sampling  clusters themselves,  which correspond  roughly to villages in rural areas, were the
same as those randomly selected  for use in the 1993  Human Resource  Development  Survey
(HRDS), hence the SCPS and HRDS data can be matched village by village 5. The total usable
SCPS sample  is 1376 households  located in 87 clusters 6.
Social  capital module of SCPS. The survey's social capital component  queried a
household  respondent  about three dimensions  of social capital: first, their membership  in
groups, second,  the characteristics  of those groups in which the households  were members,
third, the individuals  values and attitudes, particularly  their definition, and expressed level, of
trust in various groups, and their perception  of social cohesion. In this work we describe the
groups  only briefly, with a fuller description  of the groups, their activities, and the results of
qualitative  information  from interviews  and participatory  data collection  methods in a
companion  paper (Narayan, 1997).
The first set of questions  was simply  the number of groups in which an individual  was
a member. The average  number of groups  per person was 1.5 and table 1 lists the most
prevalent  groups, individuals' responses  as to their 'most important' group and the groups  they
would  join if they could join only one group.  Most groups are Christian churches,  Mosques,
the village  burial society, women's groups, and the political party.  The more purely economic
'  Also, rather than carry out new randomization,  the households  in the sample were the
same as those sampled in the 1994/95  Agricultural  Survey, with the addition  of up to five non-
agricultural  households  randomly  selected  within the cluster.
'  The survey  was implemented  in two parts, a social  capital  module  and a household
module  devoted primarily  to measuring  household  expenditures,  but unfortunately  the second  part
was only administered  in every  other cluster  so only  53 clusters  have SCPS expenditure  data.9
associations  (cooperatives,  rotating  credit groups) are much less important. In the construction
of our measure of social capital we deliberately  do not differentiate  by type of group, as the
main purpose is to examine  whether groups with non-economic  functions  have village  level
spillover  effects  on economic  outcomes'.
Table 1: Groups in rural Tanzania, by membership  and characteristics
Group as a  Number of  'Most important  'If you could join only
percent of  households  group in your  one group, which one
all  with  life at present?"  would it be?"
membership  members
Church  21  230  29  24
Political party  17  195  10  3
(CCM  )  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Burial  society  15  167  19  14
Women's group  9  104  5  8
Muslim  group  9  109  11  8
Farmer's group  8  87  8  16
Other  21  252  _  _
Notes: In this table 'Other' includes (with percent reporting):  Youth group (7), Primary
society (4), Cooperative  (2), Rotating  Credit Societies  (2), Dairy/cattle  (1) and Other (5).
In addition  to questions about membership  a second set of questions  were asked about
the characteristics  of the each group in which the individuals  reported membership. These
were grouped  into five categories: 1) kin heterogeneity  of membership,  2) income
heterogeneity  of membership,  3) group functioning,  4) group decision making, and 5)
7  Early results  suggested  that excluding  economic  groups altogether  had very little
influence  on the findings,  as would  be expected  given  their small  share.10
voluntary  membership. The five questions in the three categories  listed in detail in table 2
were those that proved useful in defining social capital for the empirical analysis  below 8.
'  Earlier  work on this data set used principal  components  to create an index  but this was
abandoned  for three reasons. First, using a multiplicative  rather than  an additive  index  to combine
membership  and characteristics  was appropriate. Second,  the principal  components  methodology
was not appropriate  as the inter-correlations  amongst  these dimensions  are not particularly  high
(the first principal  component  only  "explained"  35 percent  of the total variation). Third, the
results on the first principal  component  alone  were not robust when extended  to other data and
variables.I1
Table 2:  Questions for sub-components of social capital
Question  Responses  Freq.
Number of  How many [from a prompted  0  32.3
groups  enumeration of groups in the  1  40.4
village] are you a member of?  2  17.4
3 or greater  9.9
Answers to questions below recorded for up to three groups for each individual:
Kin  Who are (the group's] members?  I-Close  relatives  1.09
Heterogeneity  Are they the same kin or the same  2-Same clan  2.95
clan?  3-Different tribes  25.7
4-Anyone in the village  70.2
Income  Are all members from the same  1- All same livelihood  5.7
Heterogeneity  economic group, do they all make  2-Most are the same  11.9
a living in the same way?  3-Mixed  82.3
Do the leaders or group officials  1  -Different livelihood  33.2
earn their living in the same way  2-Same livelihood  66.7
as other members or in different
ways
Group  Overall, how would you rate the  1-Very poorly  2.1




If there is a fee, what happens if a  1-Asked  to leave the group  30.1
member does not pay the fee?  2-Delay in payment accepted  17.4
3-Nothing happens  52.5
Notes: Based on the non-missing observations for each category.
To combine  these  questions  into a single  numerical  index  various  strong  (and arbitrary)
assumptions  were  necessary  about  the weights  and  the  aggregation.  Since  the  variables  are on
different  discrete  scales,  all the  variables  are first  rescaled  under  the assumption  that the
observed  indicator  divided  up evenly  some  underlying  uniformly  distributed  continuous12
variable ranging from 0 to 100 into N categories 9. Second, we assume that the contribution  to
social capital  of being a member  of each group was greater if the group was more
heterogenous  across kinship groups, more inclusive  and horizontal, and better functioning.
Hence the contribution  of each group to social capital is an equally weighted  sub-index  of these
three characteristics. The village level social capital index is the product of the average
number of groups with the average  characteristics  of those groups.  Since  the absolute  scale for
this index is arbitrary we re-normalize  the index to have mean zero and standard deviation
10 one
Before  examining  the specific  hypotheses  about social capital, some information  on the
situation and activities of the people surveyed  will set the context.  Rural Tanzania  is a clear
case of arrested economic  development.  Tanzanians  are very poor, the average  per person
consumption  expenditures  reported in the 1993/94  HRDS in rural areas is 50 cents a day ($180
per person per year)".  Most of the population  is employed in traditional  agriculture,  with a
substantial  subsistence  component  as the imputed  value of production for own consumption
accounts  for half of consumption  expenditures. Nearly all agriculture is rain fed and uses
9  The numerical  value to being the k'  of the N, categories  for the lI indicator
is:  V,  = (IO0/N)*k  - IOOI(N  *2)  . As long as the value assigned to each category is the
mean of the observations  in that category  this procedure  will not induce  inconsistency  in the
resulting  estimates.
'°  This  is done using  the mean  and standard  deviation  for all 87 clusters. Therefore  the
samnples  used below  may  not have exactly  mean zero/standard  deviation  one.
"  The World Development  Report, 1995  reports Tanzania  as tied with Mozambique  for
the lowest GNP  per capita of $90.13
almost no modem inputs (see table 8 below), is labor intensive  depending primarily  on
household  labor, and uses a few rudimentary  tools with an almost complete  lack of
mechanization. The data from the HRDS confirm that the health and nutrition status of the
population  is very poor, with an infant mortality rate of 92 in 1991/92  and 47 percent of
children show signs of stunting. The government's  past emphasis  on primary schooling  means
that although  many adults in rural households  have primary schooling  and the average years of
schooling  completed  for adults is about 4.5, very few rural residents have secondary
schooling.
II.  Social CapitW  and Incomes
We show that associational  life is in fact social capital first by showing it is capital and
then by showing  that this capital is social.  After establishing  a strong association  between  the
social capital in a village  and incomes  of households  in that village we use instrumental
variables  estimation  to argue this association  is due to higher social capital leading to higher
incomes and not because higher incomes lead to greater associational  life.  We then show the
impact  of village  social capital on household  incomes  is truly social, by showing that there is
an independent  effect at the village  level.
Both the SCPS and HRDS collected  data on the economic  and demographic
characteristics  of households. Total consumption  expenditures  per person in the household
were estimated, including imputations  for own produced  consumption  and for consumer
durables (e.g. housing). We use expenditures  as a proxy for incomes (and use the terms
interchangeably)  for two reasons. First, when there is saving  and dissaving  (and especially  with14
futnctioning  capital  markets)  current expenditures  are a better measure  of permanent  income  than
is current income. Second,  extensive  experience  with household  surveys  has shown  that it is
tremendously  difficult  (if not impossible)  to measure  the incomes  of the agrarian self-employed
who constitute  the bulk of our sample  (Deaton, 1997).
In order to estimate the impact of social capital on incomes we first adopt a
specification  of the determinants  of per person household  expenditures  that includes  both
individual  (variables Z 1j) and village  (Xj) level variables' 2:
Hj=P  *Social  Capital  + a  * Z,  + y  *  X  +e
A number  of household  characteristics  are included:  the average years of schooling  of male
and female adults (over 20) in the household' 3, a dummy variable if the head of the household
was 'self-employed  in agriculture,"  a dunmmy  variable for female  headed households  and an
index of non-land, non-agricultural,  physical assets".
12  This specification  was previously  developed  and used in an examination  of rural
poverty in Tanzania  (World  Bank, 1995).
'3  The average  of both males and females  adults is used for simplicity, although  it is
worth noting that when the genders  are included  separately  the average education  of adult
females  in the household  had a much larger estimated  impact  on incomes than male schooling.
"  The index  was created  by assigning  the following  weights  to ownership  of the following
assets if they are in working  condition  (in the SCPS);  sewing  machine,  bicycle,  car, motorcycle,
van or truck, 16, radio 8, table 6, clock,  watch or bed 4, chair  3, lamps  2.  The HRDS has a less
complete  list of assets;  bicycles  16, radios  or cameras  8, watches  4.  Originally  a weight  of 400
was assigned  to bicycle,  car, motorcycle,  van or truck, but the very few  observations  with
ownership  of those assets dominated  the variation,  so it was (regrettably  and arbitrarily)
reassigned  a weight  of 16.15
There are two village level variables  besides social capital.  First, the median distance
of dwellings  in the cluster to a market for crops included  as a proxy for the market integration
of the village' 5. In addition, a set of dummy variables for six agro-climatic  regions of
Tanzania  are also included  to control partially for the economic  and agro-climatic  diversity  of
the country.
Is asocial  capital'capital?  Column 1 of table 3 presents  the results of OLS estimation
of the partial correlation between a cluster's average  household  per person expenditures  and
social capital, controlling for this set of variables. The coefficient  on the social capital index is
empirically large and moderately  statistically  significant  (p-level .08).  Households  in villages
with higher levels of social capital  have significantly  higher expenditures.
However, 'social capital" or associational  life may simply  be a normal consumption
good so that richer households  consume  more, that is, perhaps associational  life is not 'capital'
but "consumption"  consumed  more by households  with greater income or leisure' 6. If richer
individuals  live together then one would  tend to find that richer villages  are associated  with
higher village social capital. In the U.S., for example, the average income of  neighborhoods
would be associated  with higher ownership  of luxury cars, but this does not imply if poorer
is In the above mentioned  World  Bank study of rural poverty,  distance  to market was
interacted  with an index  of road quality  and produced  a strong income  effect. In our case  we
could not replicate  the road quality  index  with our HRDS sample  and so used the simpler,  but less
appealing,  measure  of distance  alone.
16  This argument  is weakened  by the fact that the social  capital  index  is only partly  a
measure  of associational  activity, as it more reflects  the nature  of groups of which  individuals  are
members  which  is at least plausibly  less  related  to income  that is the magnitude  of activity. To use
Putnam's illustration,  it may  well  be that richer individuals  bowl more but less  clear why  they
should  bowl more in groups  when they  do bowl (Putnam, 1995).16
neighborhoods  had more Mercedes  it would make them richer.  We answer this objection
about the direction of influence  between social capital and income in three ways.  In this
section  we use instrumental  variables estimation  while in the next section we show  that it is the
village's social capital that matters, not the individual's.  The final section presents  evidence
on the different causal mechanisms  by which social capital increases  incomes.17
Table 3:  Household  Expenditures  Per Person  and Social  Capital
Column:  1  2  3  4
Source  of Data:  Social  Capital  and Poverty Survey
Level of Data:  Cluster  Averages  Household
Estimation  method':  OLS  IV (a)  IV' (A)  IV (B)
Social  Capital  .119  .496  .559  .345
1.80  2.75  5.374  1.29
Household  size  -.011  -.033  -.073  -.075
.21  .424  8.66  6.21
Average  adult  schooling 2 -.030  -.105  0087  .013
.789  1.66  .512  .761
Female head of household  -.439  -.458  -.090  .070
(1 =yes)  .714  .566  .810  .676
Asset  ownership  (in) 2 .102  -.038  .176  .207
1.24  .297  2.78  3.58
Self-employed in agriculture  -.99  -.975  -.207  -.203
(1 =yes)  2.76  1.92  2.12  2.32
Distance  to nearest  market  -.023  -.015  .0062  0018
(cluster) 2 1.57  .801  286  .090
Agroclimatic  zones 4
Regre-gsinn  RtatigtiCs
Number  of Obs.  53  53  846  846
Adjusted R-Squared  .272
First Stage  Incremental  R2  - .119  .099  072
Instrument  test (p-level)  --  .274  |  .004  .345
Notes: 1) The t-statistics  are Huber corrected  standard  errors that are heteroskedasticity  consistent
and account  for stratified  random  sampling.
2) If observations  for any of these  variables  for any households  were missing,  a value a missing
value dummy  variable  is set equal  to one (not reported).
3) The instrument  sets are a: trust in strangers,  tribesman,  cell leader, village  chairman
(government),  district  officials,  central  government  while  instrument  set B excludes  strangers.
4) Included  in the regressions  but not reported  are dummy  variables  for each of six agro-climatic
zones.
Instrumental variables estimation uses the correlation between social capital and another
variable--the instrument--which is not determined by, and does not directly determine,  income18
to estimate the impact of exogenous  shifts in social capital  on income. This eliminates  the
difficulty  created by the potentially  simultaneous  determination  of income  and social capital.
The drawback  is that one must have valid instruments, and worse, the validity  of an instrument
depends entirely  on theoretical  arguments  about the structure  of the model since at least some
set of the 'just identifying' assumptions  cannot be directly tested.
As mentioned  above, questions  were posed to households  about individual's 'trust" in
various groups. We posit that certain of the these "trust"  variables, particularly  an individual's
trust in strangers  and trust in various government  officials, are not affected  directly by
household  income nor do they affect income directly, but that greater levels of trust do lead to
higher village social capital".  Column  2 of table 3 shows  the IV estimates  of the social capital
impact  using cluster level data based on those  assumptions. The estimated  effect of social
capital is substantially  larger than the OLS estimates  and is now strongly  statistically
significant. This supports a view that social capital is an exogenous  determinant  of income
because if social capital were purely a consumption  good and higher incomes  led to greater
social capital  then the IV estimates  of the effect of social capital should have been lower than
the OLS estimates, instead  of much higher. The higher estimate is consistent  with a lack of
joint determination  of the two variables and a large degree of measurement  error in our social
capital variable  since measurement  error leads to bias towards zero' 8.
" A recent  investigation  using cross  national  data from the World Values  Surveys  does
find  a strong  bivariate  correlation  between  expressed  degrees  of trust and membership  in
associations  (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,  Shleifer,  and Vishny,  1997).
"' The fact that the IV estimates  are higher may  reflect  measurement  error in the village
level social  capital  variable. Since  we are using only  between 15 to 20 households  per cluster,  the19
Columns 3 and 4 of table 3 show the same expenditure  regressions  at the household
level.  Using the household  level data we get very similar results on social capital, a
coefficient  of .56 or .34 depending  on the instrument  set compared to .49 using the cluster
level.  Not surprisingly,  the estimates  on the control variables, such as education, are more
reasonable  using the household  data.
The standard  test for the exogeneity  of the instrument  set (which is essentially  a test
that trust does not itself cause higher incomes  except through its effect on social capital) does
not reject the instruments  in the cluster  data, but the test does reject the instrument  set in the
household  data.  The variable 'trust in strangers' causes the instrument  set rejection, which is
puzzling  as it is the most plausibly  exogenous  a priori as we thought trust in strangers would
be the least likely to be affected  by income or associational  activity. Estimation  using the
household  data without "trust in strangers' as an instrument  provides a quantitatively  similar
(.34) but less precisely  estimated  (t-stat 1.27) coefficient  on social capital and the exogeneity
test is not rejected.
Is "social  capital"social? The second  question is whether participation  in associational
life raises incomes only of those who directly participate  or whether social capital  produces
spillovers  to other individuals. We can address this question in two compelling  ways.
cluster  level average  social  capital  will contain  a substantial  component  of measurement  error in
measuring  the true cluster  social  capital. If this were a univariate  regression,  the ratio of the OLS
to IV estimates  is an estimate  of the ratio of the true signal  to the total variance. The estimates
suggest  the noise  is very large. The correlation  in repeated  measurements  is also a measure  of the
noise  to signal  ratio. While  we do not have repeated  measurements  in the same  villages  for social
capital,  the correlation  of the two village  level estimates  of expenditures  per person  is .45, so if
the magnitude  of measurement  error between  the two variables  is similar  these  are consistent.20
First,  column 1 of table 4 shows the result of regressing household incomes on the
social capital of the village (calculated net of each household's  contribution to village social
capital) and on the household's  own social capital.  All of the effect is due to the village level
social capital and none is due to the household's own measured social capital.  This finding is
especially compelling because mtiost  of the variation in the social capital index is actually across
households within the same village, which should make it easy to estimate the household effect
precisely and difficult to estimate the village effect.21
Table 4: Household Expenditures Per Person and Social Capital, Comparing the Village and Household
Level and Using HRDS data for Incomes.
Column:  1  2  3  4
Source of Data:  SCPS  Human Resource and Development Survey
Level of data:  Household  Cluster  Household
Type of estimation':  OLS  IV  IV 5 (a)  IV (B)
Cluster Level Social Capital  .084  .208  .193  .227
1.10  2.56  2.31  1.71
Household Level Social Capital'  -.020
.526
Household size  -.077  .019  -.080  -.079
7.61  1.04  10.5  10.3
Average adult schooling 2 .019  -.057  .021  .021
1.43  1.42  2.87  2.79
Female head of household (1 =yes)  -.041  .345  -.009  -.010
(.448)  1.19  .150  .173
Asset ownership (In) 2 .253  .245  .143  .143
4.40  3.88  5.26  5.20
Self-employed in agriculture (I =yes)  -.193  -.325  -.068  -.069
l  2.36  1.19  1.69  1.68
Distance to nearest mnarket  (clstr) 2 -.0036  -.004  -.0087  -.0087
.243  1.05  2.21  2.21
Agroclimatic zone dummies'
lRegre-scinn  statictics
Number of  Observations  846  84  1505  1505
Adjusted R-Squared  .215  - -
First stage Incremental R 2 - .092  .116  .061
Instrument test ( p-level)  _  .618  .783  .786
Notes: 1)  Tbe t-statistics are based on Huber corrected standard errors that are heteroskedasticity consistent
and account for stratified sampling.
2)  If any of these variables were mnissing  then a value was imputed for that household and a missing dumrnmy
variable is set equal to one.
3)  Cluster level social capital index excludes household's own response.
4) Included in the regressions but not reported are dummy variables for each of six agro-climatic zones and
the three missing value dunmny  variables.
5)  The instrument sets are a: trust in strangers, tribcsman, cell leader, village chairman (government),
district officials, central govermnent while instrunent  set B excludes strangers.22
The second way we show that the social capital effect is a village, and not only a
household,  effect is to match the HRDS data on expenditure  per household  and other
household  and village characteristics  with the SCPS  data on social capital at the village level.
The households  surveyed  to estimate  expenditures  are in the same villages  but are not (except
for possible  coincidental  repeats) the same households  used to measure social capital.  Column
2 of table 4 shows the results of regressing  household  incomes from the HRDS on social
capital from the SCPS (and the other household  and cluster variables calculated  from the
HRDS)  using instrumental  variables  estimation. The estimated impact is still large and
statistically  significant  in both the cluster and household  level regressions. That is, the social
capital of the households  interviewed  in the SCPS has an impact  on the incomes  of other
households in their village (surveyed two years previously) as well as on their own incomes'9.
This is like finding that one household's land or asset ownership is important  not only for their
own but also for their neighbor's output.  It is hard to overstate the importance  and uniqueness
of this result, as this implies  that at least some significant  fraction  of associational  life creates
capital that is locally social.
Moreover, these results provide a powerful second argument against  a causation from
income  to greater social capital. If individuals  with higher incomes have greater social capital
because social capital is a luxury (or even normal) good then one would expect the results
would only appear when linking a given household's income  to that same household's social
19  This similarity  is all the more  remarkable  given  the very low correlations  of cluster  level
averages  across  the two surveys  for most of the variables. The Spearman  correlation  coefficient
is .42 for expenditures  per person, .12 for average  education,  .13 for assets, .33 for median
distance  to market.23
capital 20. But this demand for association  interpretation  is not supported by the results in table
4 which show strong spillover  impacts.
Before  moving to the next section  detailing  the mechanisms  of effect, let us pause and
admit the results are somewhat  an embarrassment  of riches.  We would not have guessed  at
impacts  as large as those estimated, especially  given all the obvious empirical  difficulties in
measurement,  equation  specification,  etc.  The instrumental  variable estimates  from SCPS
imply that a one standard deviation  increase  in village social capital increases  the income  of all
households  in the village by approximately  50 percent and those using the HRDS by 20
percent.  In more concrete terms, if half the village are members  of one group (with average
characteristics)  this village  would have a social capital index that is higher by one standard
deviation  than a village  where group membership  was zero 2l.  While increasing  average
membership  by one-half group per household  (or changing  group characteristics  to a similar
degree) is a substantial  shift in social behavior, the estimates  suggest this would increase
expected incomes by 20 to 50 percent, which is an impressively  large impact.
Either of these impacts  on income is very large relative to other well-known
determinants  of income, such as schooling  or physical assets.  A one standard  deviation
increase in education, which is an additional  3 years of schooling  per adult, would increase
20  This is true unless  all of the income  variation  across  households  is due to village  effects,
while  in fact nearly  all the observed  variation  in household  incomes  is due to non-cluster  related
household  effects.
21  Since  the index is multiplicative  between  group membership  and the characteristics  of
groups matter and since  the index  is normalized  twice it requires  some  working  back to find out
that, evaluated  at the average  group characteristics,  increasing  group membership  by .5 would
increase  the social capital  index  by one standard  deviation.24
incomes by only between 3 and 5 percent. Similarly, increasing  non-farm physical assets by
one standard deviation  is associated  with only a 19 to 22 percent increase in expenditures.
Table 5: Magnitude  of the estimates  of various determinants  of income.  l
Variable:  Source of  Point  Standard  Increase in
estimates  Estimate  Deviation  expenditures  from one std.
dev. increase:
Dollars 2
Percent' H 3 Per
____  ____  __  ____  ___  ___  person  '
Social  capital  SCPS, household  .56  1  56  655  101
SCPS, cluster  .49  1  49  690  106
HRDS, household  .19  1  19  222  34
HRDS,  cluster  .21  1  21  245  38
Education  SCPS, household  .009  3.21  2.9  34  5.2
HRDS, household  .019  2.70  5.1  60  9.2
Assets  SCPS, household  .18  1.24  22  261  40
HRDS,  household  .14  1.36  19  222  34
Notes: 1) Using natural log change as approximation  to percentage change.  2)  Based  on
the assumption  of mean per capita consumption  of $180.  3) At the household  average  of
6.5 members  per household.
Incidental  association, is this really social capital? There remains the possibility  that
the estimated  effects of village  social capital are merely an artifact and that social capital is
proxying for some unobserved  characteristic  of villages (the omitted variable must be at the
village, not household  level to explain the HRDS results).  It is impossible  to reject this
possibility  econometrically,  because  village level 'fixed effects' which would eliminate  the25
potential bias would also preclude estimating  the village level spillover effect of social capital
that is the most interesting. We can however reduce the plausibility  of incidental  association
and omitted variable  bias stories in two ways.
First, we can ask how bad it could possibly be.  If an omitted variable were biasing  the
social capital coefficient  upward, the magnitude  of the bias would be worse the larger the
effect of this omitted  cluster specific variable.  The importance  of excluded  cluster variables
can be examined  by comparing  the R2 of various regressions  explaining  household  incomes.
With only household  characteristics  the R2 is .262 in the HRDS; adding social capital and
cluster distance to markets and agroclimatic  dummies raises it to .291, while adding the cluster
averages  of all the individual  variables (education,  assets, etc.) raises it further to .342. A full
set of cluster dummy variables  in addition to the household  characteristics  raises the R-squared
to .462, so there is about 12 points of unexplained  cluster  variation. This relatively large
variation in household  incomes that is both cluster specific  and unexplained  by the included
variables  might suggest a potentially  large omitted variables  bias.  However, the correlation  of
the cluster effect estimates  across the two data sets is only .07.  This suggests the unexplained
cluster variation is mostly  temporary  random shocks  or measurement  error and not due to
some time persistent  excluded variable  correlated with social capital which would significantly
bias the resultsn2.
'2  The alternative  is that the lurking  omitted  variable  is so highly  correlated  with social
capital  that its effect  once  controlling  for social  capital  is very small. This however,  begins  to beg
the question,  as it is extremely  unlikely  the "omitted"  variable  and social capital  are perfectly
correlated  unless  both are in some  sense a proxy for the same  underlying  social  reality.26
The alternative tack for addressing  omitted  variable bias is the usual "kitchen  sink"
robustness  test by adding to the regression  all the cluster level variables  for which we can
create measures. The first row of table 6 shows  the 'base case" estimate while the following
rows show the estimate of social capital with different sets of cluster specific  variables added.
Adding the cluster averages  of all the household  level variables  already included  in the
regression  only slightly lowers the estimate (and raises the t-statistic).
Table 6:  Robustness  of the estimate on social capital to inclusion  of other variables,
using the HRDS  household  level data.
Coefficient  (t-statistic)  Variables  included
on  social  capital
.193  Base set (table  4, column 1)
(2.31)
.178  Base set plus cluster averages  of education, assets, household
(2.61)  size, female headship,  self-employed  in agriculture.
.267  Base set plus land quality variable from SCPS
(2.89)
.273  Base set plus land quality variable from HRDS
(2.88)
.155  Base set plus district population  density and financial  institutions
(2.01)  per person.
Notes: Full regressions  in appendix 1.
The most plausible candidate  for a variable that could cause both higher incomes and
higher social capital and is excluded  from our base case regression  is land quality.  As has
been argued by Binswanger,  Khandker  and Rosenzweig  (1993), higher quality land leads to
higher output, greater density  of population, and more physical and financial  infrastructure.
These greater levels of economic  activity might in turn lead to greater social capital.  We27
address the land quality question  in two ways. In the SCPS households  were asked to
subjectively  rank the quality of their land and of the land in the village  generally. Including
the village  level land quality does not alter the strength or significance  of social capital (and
produces puzzling  results)23.  The next best is to add explanatory  variables  which ought to be
related  to land quality on this theory, such as population  density  and banking facilities  per
person 24. As seen in row 5 of table 6 the addition  of these variables  does not substantially  alter
the strength of the social capital  effect.
III) But how does social capital work?
Econometric  estimates  show  a large (and arguably causative)  effect of a village's level
of social capital on the incomes  of all households  in that village.  Our understanding  of this
result is enhanced  by understanding  the proximate  mechanisms  through  which social capital
affects incomes in rural Tanzania. As reviewed  in the introduction, the literature has
suggested  five plausible channels  of influence  each of which we now explore>.
'  The land  quality  variable  is consistently  negative  in the income  regression  (although  not
always  significantly  so). This is likely  due to the weakness  of the subjective  ranking,  as when
ranked  on a scale  of I to 5 a disproportionate  number  of individual  responses  were heaped  on 3
which  gives  the data very little  variation,  a problem  compounded  by averaging  over clusters.
2'Although  the story-line  about bank activity  following  economic  activity  is mitigated  in
the Tanzanian  case  by the fact that the financial  sector was completely  dominated  by one large
parastatal,  a famously  non-profit  maximizing  commercial  bank.
'Economists have perhaps  tended  to neglect  the role of social  factors  in economnic
outcomes  not out of any well-founded  belief  these were unimportant,  but more because  they were
difficult  to model  and measure. In particular,  there is a danger  of confusing  statements  about
what outcomes  would be under  the assumptions  of purely  individualistic  behavior  in which
"market failures" are often discussed with actual positive  statements about what would in fact
happen. There is a clear role for social  capital  within  any positive  economic  theory of actual28
Social capital and effective  public services. Unfortunately,  we do not have the clean
natural experiment  as in the Italian case studied  by Putnam with creation of new regional
governments  with clearly assigned  responsibilities. Tanzania  since independence  has been
controlled  by the same party which, although  government  is organized along provincial  and
district lines, has exercised centralized  control over nearly all government  and party activities.
While there has been large emphasis  on  "cooperative'  and 'village" level organizations  these
were not autonomous  locally  controlled  organizations,  but a monopoly  of the party 26. This
means that we cannot match data on social capital to the level of government  jurisdiction
formally  responsible  for the provision of public services. Therefore any effect of social capital
on the effectiveness  of publicly provided services  must work indirectly, perhaps through
greater cooperation  of villagers in monitoring  the performance  of government,  rather than
directly through  the formal political  apparatus.
The HRDS has data on the quality of two government  provided public services, schools
and health clinics. While the objective "quality' of a school or clinic is difficult  to measure,
the HRDS measured  the subjectively  perceived  quality  using an innovative  two step procedure.
Households  were first asked  to rank the importance  to them of each of five characteristics  of
their local school  and health clinic, by allocating  20 stones across five pictures that represented
facility  characteristics. Each respondent  was then asked to assess  the quality of their local
facility  on those same characteristics  on a scale of one to five.  From these sets of questions  an
social  outcomes  but modeling  it convincingly  is very difficult.
26  In particular  during  the 1970s  the government  pursued a policy  of forced "villagization"
which  was neither  particularly  well  received  by those affected,  nor successful.29
index  of the subjectively  perceived  quality of each public facility (school or health clinic) can
be constructed 27.
The HRDS asked  a series of questions  about the level of parental and community
involvement  in the schools which allow us to construct  an index of parental participation 2'.
The HRDS also asked individuals  about their attendance  at 'meetings where issues important  to
the community,  such as health and education,  could be discussed.'  Table 7 shows  that social
capital in the SCPS survey is associated  with higher reported levels of parental participation  in
schools  and attendance  at community  meetings  in the HRDS  data (which surveyed  different
individuals  than those used to measure social capital). Moreover, higher social capital was
associated  with higher levels of school quality. These fmdings  trace out a possible chain of
causation from greater social capital to more parental  and community involvement  in schools
to better quality schools. There is, however, no link at all between health facility quality and
social capital. This is perhaps  not surprising as the major factors for health clinics were drug
27  Arithmetically, quality index in the ji village based on the ik household's assessed
importance  of the characteristic  a. and household's ranking of that characteristic  R  is defined
as:  Q'i  Nx  I  (¢l  c  *R 6 )  .The principal difficulty  with this measure at the cluster
as:J  NJ
level is that there is little coherence  among  household's rankings  of the same facility.  That is,
on each of the five rankings  of school quality, within cluster differences  account for more than
85 percent of the total variation, which raises some questions  about reliability  or interpretation
of the rankings.
2' The questions  asked about the closest  government  primary  school  were: "Are parents
asked  to participate  in decisions  affecting  the school  [NAME]?"  "Does the school have  an active
parents/teacher  committee?"  "Does the school [NAME]  have open days for parents  to visit?"
"Does the school  report grades?"30
availability  and qualified doctors (appendix  2), factors which are largely  beyond village
control 29.
Table 7:  Correlation  of social capital with indicators of parental participation  in
schools, school  quality, and health facility quality
Survey  Bivariate  rank correlations
Social Capital  Group Functioning
Index  Sub-Component
Median parental participation  HRDS  .243  .202
in schools  (.025)  (.065)
Attendance  at community  HRDS  .296  .117
meetings  (.006)  (.291)
School quality  HRDS  .176  .238
(.108)  (.029)
Health facility  quality  HRDS  .132  -.039
(.228)  (.724)
Participation  in joint efforts at  SCPS  .147  .272
road repairs  (.182)  (.012)
Notes: p-levels in parenthesis.
Social capital and village  level cooperation Another  possible  channel  for the impact  of
social capital is the management  of resources  that are treated as common  property within the
village  (or perhaps  among a few villages)  such as improved  water supplies, local irrigation
capabilities,  and local roads.  Unfortunately  on this question we have very little data, but in
29 While we do confirm an association  between  social capital, community  involvement
and better public services, we should  point out that strictly speaking  this does not go far in
"explaining"  the income effect of social capital as a proximate  determinant,  as we have no
evidence on the magnitude  of the link from better schools to higher incomes and moreover, in
the data above the link with income and the quantity  of schooling  is quite weak in tables 3 and
4.31
the SCPS  households  were asked if they participated  in joint activities  aimed at building or
maintaining  roads.  Villages with more social capital are more likely to have had community
road building activities (table 7).  This does suggest  another possible link through  village
cooperative  activity.
Social capital and agricultural  practices. While each of the above illustrated  some
channel  through  which social capital affected  outcomes, in neither could a solid link be made
with higher incomes, which, given the economic  context, are mainly determined  by
agricultural  incomes. Much more important  as a proximate  determinant  of incomes is that
households  in villages with larger social capital are much more likely to have used fertilizer,
agro-chemical  inputs, or improved  seeds (table 8).  A standard deviation  increase  in village
social capital increases  the probability  of using agro-chemicals  by 42 percent (6.7 percentage
points above a mean of 16), of using fertilizer  by 38 percent (5 percentage  points) and of using
improved  seeds by 17 percent (2 percentage  points). We also find that in villages  with higher
social capital a larger fraction  of households  report using credit for agricultural  improvements.
Since only 9 percent of households  report using credit, the one standard deviation  of social
capital effect is to increase  credit use by almost a third (2.7 percentage  points). As with the
income effects, these results are surprisingly  strong. The positive association  of the adoption
of improved  practices and credit use with social capital  hold true whether  one controls for the
individual's self-reported  land quality or extent of the individual's contact  with an extension
agent.32
Table 8:  Household  probability  of adopting  improved  agricultural  practices
(dF/dX calculated from Probit estimates).  l
Used Agro-  Used  Used  Used credit
chemicals  fertilizer  Improved  for
Seeds  agricultural
improvements
Village social capital  .057  .075  .015  .027
(2.35)  (2.45)  (.737)  (1.66)
Household  size  .012  -.006  .004  -.0019
(3.25)  (1.43)  (1.03)  (.742)
Average household  adult  .019  .0078  .010  .0044
education  (5.00)  (1.56)  (2.30)  (1.21)
Female Head  -.102  -.112  -.114  .0035
(2.89)  (3.46)  (3.51)  (.143)
Assets  .049  .110  .058  .0069
(2.45)  (6.28)  (2.63)  (.606)
Self employed in  .046  -.035  -.037  .027
agriculture  (1.49)  (.958)  (1.06)  (1.03)
Median distance  to market  -.013  .005  -.005  -.0052
(2.34)  (.855)  (1.16)  (1.51)
Observed  probability  .217  .197  .169  .093
Pred. Probability  at means  .155  .129  .125  .078
N  772  734  765  842
Pseudo R-Squared 3 .204  .254  .147  .071
Notes: 1) The t-statistics  reported are the Huber corrected  for the probit regression
coefficients,  not the t-statistics  of the reported marginal effects.
2)  Included  in the regression  but not reported were dummy variables for agro-
climatic  zones, and for missing  values of the assets, schooling, and distance  to
market variables.
These results on the adoption  of improved  practices are consistent  with at least three of
the stories about the effect of social capital: innovation  diffusion, overcoming  market failures33
due to imperfect  information,  and informal insurance. There are arguments for and against
each of these explanations  of the differences  in agricultural  practices.
Innovation  diffusion. The increased  use of agricultural inputs is consistent  with a story
of better diffusion  of information,  both about the availability  and the proper use of seeds,
fertilizer and chemicals. However, given that clearly superior  practices are usually  adopted
very rapidly and that the listed 'innovations' have been around for some time it is doubtful this
channel  could explain such large differences.
Imperfect  infornation.  It has long been recognized  that economic  performance  will be
enhanced by a social situation  in which market transactions  are facilitated. This in turn is
enhanced  by greater degrees of confidence  that one's potential  partners are likely to be reliable
and by greater information. This in turn is affected  by a number of factors, such as the
available  mechanisms  for formal or informal  enforcement  and expected compliance  with social
norms.  Grief (1993)  argues that personal ties and reputations  among  traders were an important
part of the development  of long distance  trade.  Transaction  patterns generated  by social ties in
environments  of weak formal enforcement  are coimmon,  especially  in business networks
among  ethnically  or culturally  similar groups.
Informal insurance.  It could be that risk aversion among  low income  households
inhibits the adoption  of high return innovations  if they are associated  with higher risk.  While
each element of this story is plausible, there is no connection  between the degree of inequality
among households  in the same village  and social capital.  In the same multivariate
specification  as used for the level of incomes, the social capital index has a zero estimated
association  with either the standard  deviation  of log expenditures  or the coefficient  of variation34
of expenditures  (using data from both surveys). The estimated impact  of social capital on
median expenditures  is quite similar (slightly  higher) than for mean expenditures  (whereas an
effect that shifted the dispersion  of log normally distributed  incomes would  affect these two
differently). These findings  suggest  social capital  appears to shift (natural log) expenditures
upward without affecting the inequality  of the distribution. It is possible  that informal
insurance  increased incomes  and the variance  of incomes  but that the variance  increase in
incomes  is just offset so as the variance  of expenditures  is unchanged. However, the lack of
association  between expenditure  inequality  combined  with the limitation  that the data we have,
which contain no direct evidence  on intra household  transfers  or informal  insurance, leaves  the
question open.
Conclusion
Using a specially  designed large scale survey (SCPS) to measure the degree and
characteristics  of associational  activity, as a proxy for social capital, and trust among
households  in rural Tanzania, we find that a one standard  deviation  increase  in the village
social capital index (as would be caused  by half the village  joining one additional  group with
average characteristics)  is associated  with at least 20 percent higher expenditures  per person in
each household  in the village. The link between the social capital index from the SCPS survey
and expenditures  measured  in an earlier survey of different households  in the same villages
(HRDS) shows convincingly  this effect is social and operates at the village  level.  The social
capital  of a household's village  is as important  in determining  the household's income as many
of the household's own characteristics  which receive  a great deal of attention  (e.g. schooling,35
assets or distance  to markets, gender of household  head).  Social capital is an important, and
so far largely missing, dimension  of income and poverty analysis.  Poverty  analysis that
focuses  exclusively  on the 'capital" of individuals  and ignores the local, community  and social
context could be missing  a large part of the poverty puzzle (Narayan, 1997).
Moreover, we identify  a number  of theoretically  plausible proximate  mechanisms
whereby  social capital affects  individual  incomes. Households  in villages  with more social
capital are more likely to enjoy better public services, use advanced agricultural  practices,  join
in communal  activities  and use credit for agricultural  improvements. These identified  channels
whereby  social capital acts to increase  incomes,  together with the econometric  robustness  of
the magnitude  of the social capital effect to the use of instrumental  variable estimation
techniques, suggest  that social capital is capital and not merely a consumption  good.
WNhile  these results are very strong, we do not want to overstate  the claims that can be
supported  by these results. First, while we do show that the level of social capital affects  the
level of income we do not make claims that the level of social capital affects  the growth  rate of
incomes (but in this regard social capital is similar in its effects to physical and human capital).
Second, there is clearly scope  for institutional  substitution  in the modes of resolving  these
types of 'market failure" in cooperation  and while some may be social capital intensive  others
are likely  to involve  more formal, bureaucratic,  technocratic,  and  less personalistic  modes. It
may well be that the problem is not so much with not having a deep associational  network  or
not having  a well run bureaucracy  with impartial  enforcement  of rules but in not having  either.
Third, these results do not immediately  generalize  to all other social and economic  contexts.36
The results of this paper alone are obviously  insufficient  as a basis for policy, but do
raise important  considerations  and suggest exploration  in several areas.  First, since social
capital is capital, investing  in it is potentially  beneficial  to individuals,  but since social capital
is social it is unlikely  that the market will produce  the right amount. But that the market will
not produce  the right amount creates no presumption  government  action will produce  the right
amount  either.  This research has not empirically  identified  any policy levers available  to
expand  social capital or estimated the costs of creating social capital3P.
With the present state of knowledge, "do no harm" is probably the best guide.  While
seemingly  platitudinous,  this advice is non-trivial  and has serious bite.  Many would  argue that
the previous  centralizing,  technocratic  and excessively  narrow tendencies  of some
governments,  and especially  of development  assistance, may have 'mined' rather than created
social capital and may have in fact done significant  harm (Ostrom, 1995).
Second,  these results are consistent  with the increasing  emphasis  on both broadening
and localizing  decision making power.  This is a common  thread running through  a number of
different recent research and reform initiatives: greater emphasis  on beneficiary  participation
(World  Bank, 1994, Isham, Narayan and Pritchett, 1995, Narayan, 1995), greater role for
local and development  NGOs in service provision (Riddell  and Robinson, 1995),
decentralization  (or federalization)  and localization  of public services (Binswanger,  1995),
increased  emphasis  on community  (Narayan, 1996),  the (still too infrequent)  use of "demand"
300ne  of the intriguing  things about Putnam  (1993) is that he traces the determinants  of
regional  variations  in social capital  in Italy back hundreds  of years  to happenstance  of ancient
history. While  this is great for solving  the research  problem  of purging  the estimates  of joint
endogeneity,  since  history  is irreversible,  it is not much  help  for policy.37
driven procedures  in social funds, and recognition  of the role citizen voice plays in the efficacy
of government  projects (Isham, Kaufmann, and Pritchett, 1996). The present results
emphasize  the role of local conditions  but also raise the issue that with any delegation of
responsibility  or power to more "grassroots"  levels, some  communities  are going to be more
effective  than others.  While this is no argument against such reforms, this differential  capacity
(perhaps due to differing  social capital) will need to be considered,  with efforts to expand
capacities  of local weak groups.38
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Appendix  table 2.1: School  and  health  facility  quality  indicators
Schools  Health facility
Characteristic  Mean  Mean  Characteristic  Mean  Mean
Weight  Ranking  Weight  Ranking
Wel qualified  teachers  .252  3.18  Drugs  always  available  .261  2.29
who teach  children  well  when  you visit
Excellent  headmaster  who  .188  3.41  Well  qualified,  .228  3.12
manages  the school  well  trustworthy  doctors  and
nurses
Enough  supplies  so each  .245  2.46  Close  to your homes,  in  .165  2.91
child  has a desk  and  the village  or ward
workbooks
Clean  building  with  toilets  .163  2.75  Clean, with  toilet, safe  .155  2.93
and playground  water, covered  waiting
area
Emphasizes  academics,  .149  3.15  Public  services:  .189  2.98
requiring  no self reliance  sanitation,  immunization,
work  control  of pests
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